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SUBJECT: DUTCH ASK USG HELP WITH TURKEY ON CYPRUS, AND GREECE

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

**¶1.** (C) Summary: Still expecting a positive outcome on December 17 for Turkey, the Dutch DG for the EU, Marnix Krop, sees trouble brewing on Greece and Cyprus and has asked the U.S. to help in two specific ways. First, urged us to impress upon Turkey the problems that Turkey's Aegean flights have for Greece at this time. Second, U.S. assistance would be helpful in encouraging the Turks to deal directly with the Greek Cypriots. Krop reported Austria is getting traction with some new EU 10 members (including Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary) by suggesting that Turkish accession would force them to make undesirable financial sacrifices. End Summary.

**¶2.** (C) Marnix Krop, MFA DG for Enlargement, told the DCM on November 18 that the EU is on track to set a date for accession talks with Turkey at the December 17 Council, but some serious obstacles remain. He said the Netherlands is working for a Council decision on December 17 that sets the opening of accession talks with Turkey in the second half of 2005 with no need for another decision. The Dutch are working to dissuade those who seek open-endedness in the negotiations or any additional decision points along the way. Krop expects the Council results to be more stringent on Turkey than the Commission report. Krop added that he would not expect full Turkish membership before 2017, and at that time there might be put in place controls (or at least transition periods) on labor migration.

**¶3.** (C) Krop said Turkey could help its case now, by taking "symbolically important" unilateral steps to improve the atmospherics, both for the December 17 negotiations and for the lukewarm-at-best European public opinion. These could include setting up an extra, independent monitoring mechanism for torture or reopening the Halki Greek Orthodox seminary. Turning to Greece, Krop said it seems clear Greece "really wants Turkey in the EU." He specifically asked for U.S. help now to make Turkey aware of the problems Turkish flights over the Aegean near Greece are causing, in order to head off "a new Greek tragedy." The Greek Foreign Minister, in The Hague on November 17, proffered "new, troubling language for the Council decision that would be a brake to the accession talks," Krop said. The DCM noted the Political Director Siblesz-U/S Grossman call (of the same day) and said that the USG has heard the Netherlands request "loud and clear."

**¶4.** (C) Turning to Cyprus, Krop said in no uncertain terms that "Cyprus will veto Turkey" if Turkey does not find a way to send a "credible signal" to Cyprus on recognition on or before December 17 (even if action comes further down the road). There are different legal and strategic opinions on how far Turkey's signal of recognition really has to go, Krop admitted. He "did not think it necessary for Turkey to give Cyprus full recognition at this time," but "a solution would have to be found somewhere." The minimum would be that Turkey act on the Council's invitation to sign the protocol to the Ankara Agreement. Krop added, "If Turkey does just this one step, we are not sure if it would be enough for Cyprus. It might be, if Turkey is forthcoming on confidence building measures and atmospherics." Such a measure from Turkey might include a "unilateral declaration" on how Turkey would foresee dealing with the GOC in the period of the negotiations, such as "recognition without prejudice to the outcome of the unification issue," Krop surmised.

**¶5.** (C) Krop said he saw a need but did not quite know how to bring Turkey and Cyprus together to speak directly about all these variables and possible outcomes. The key is to remove unpredictability between two sides that practice brinkmanship negotiations. It was critical to choreograph the talks from now until December 17 and perhaps some third party might have to play a convening role. Krop was not sure this job could fall to the Dutch, who want to avoid being at cross-purposes with their Presidency. He asked that the U.S. help persuade the Turks to have some contact with the GOC.

**¶6.** (C) The Austrian led, German CDU inspired, effort to seek a "third way" solution causes problems for the Dutch. Austria's real goal is to have the Council set a second date, around 2014, for taking a second look at Turkish membership, in conjunction with the negotiations over institutions and financing. They argue that Turkish membership would over-stress the Union's absorption capacity, Krop said. This lobbying is "falling on fertile ground in Slovakia, Slovenia

and perhaps Hungary," Krop reported, explaining that Austria is scaring them about the effect of Turkish membership on their new agricultural, structural and solidarity payments from the EU, which presumably would dwindle when resources shift to the much poorer (by comparison) Turkey after her accession.

SOBEL